This paper analyses the impact of different regulation and supervision approaches, as well as deposit insurance schemes, on the development of financial cooperatives in developing countries, using random and fixed effects estimators. Information on laws regulating financial cooperatives, the supervisory approaches adopted, and deposit insurance schemes in sixty-five developing countries were collected-mostly-from original legislations for the period 1995-2014. Key findings suggest that indicators of financial cooperative development are positively correlated with the existence of a specialized regulation; supervision under non-bank financial supervisory authorities; and the presence of deposit insurance schemes, while general cooperative society's regulations and banking regulations are negatively correlated with financial cooperatives' indicators. These results are robust after controlling for economic and institutional factors as well as potential endogeneity bias.
Introduction
The 2007-2008 financial crisis showed how rapid financial expansion without sufficient regulation could have drastic consequences that go beyond the financial sector and threaten the stability of the whole economy. A financial system dominated solely by † Published in the Annals of Finance, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany. Please cite as Khafagy, A. (2018) . Regulation, supervision and deposit insurance for financial cooperatives: an empirical investigation, Annals of Finance, 14(2), 143-193. joint-stock commercial and investment banks may have serious weaknesses and systemic risks that affect the stability of the sector. Growing empirical literature suggest that financial cooperatives tend to be more stable as they are risk-averse and less exposed to capital markets' volatilities, and-in many cases as or-more cost-efficient compared to other commercial banks. In addition, there is solid empirical literature
showing that financial cooperatives provide credit to more small and medium enterprises than commercial banks do, and are better able to reach low-income populations than other microfinance institutions. 1 Yet, few empirical studies explored why financial cooperatives grow in some emerging economies and not in other similar ones. Périlleux et al. (2016) argued that financial cooperatives benefit from the underdevelopment of the commercial banking sector in developing countries, while Khafagy (2017) found that political institutions have incentives to deliberately oppose or support the development of financial cooperatives. This essay is highly inspired by Cuevas and Fischer (2006) . Here I used unbalanced panel data covering the period from 1995 to 2014 to examine the impact of different regulation and supervision approaches, in addition to deposit insurance schemes, on the development of financial cooperatives in developing countries. An enabling regulatory and supervisory environment is a prerequisite for the growth and development of financial cooperatives, and as the sector grows and becomes more complex, regulations must be responsive to ensure the stability and the effectiveness of the sector.
In many developing countries, financial cooperatives are fully regulated by a general cooperative societies' law that regulates all type of cooperative organisations, including non-financial cooperatives (e.g. agricultural, consumer, or housing cooperatives…etc.), ignoring the financial intermediation nature of financial cooperatives. While in other countries, financial cooperatives fall completely under the regulatory and supervisory responsibility of the central bank or the bank superintendence. In the last decade, more countries adopted a specialised law for financial cooperatives or separate and detailed provisions regulating financial cooperatives under a non-specialised financial cooperatives law. In few countries, especially in Latin America, central banks or bank superintendence regulate and supervise large financial cooperatives only while smaller financial cooperatives fall under different regulatory framework. Other countries keep financial cooperatives under legislations intended to govern the operations of all microfinance institutions. There is no common agreement over which of these different legal approaches work better to support the growth and resilience of the sector in developing countries. In addition, there is no empirical evidence that argues in favour of a specific supervisory approach to be more suitable for financial cooperatives, or whether deposit insurance schemes enhance or threaten the growth of financial cooperatives. In this chapter, I tried to explore whether the size and outreach of the financial cooperative sector is shaped by the regulatory and supervisory approach adopted, and if deposit insurance schemes support or discourage the development of the sector.
The findings of this chapter has important policy implications suggesting that a specialised regulation for financial cooperatives is more likely to support the growth of the sector, while there is a serious concern over the viability of applying commercial banks or cooperative societies' regulations to financial cooperatives. In addition, the analysis encourages the introduction of deposit insurance as an important instrument that can promote confidence in the sector. The following sections of the chapter are organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses current regulation and supervision approaches, and the advantages and disadvantages of deposit insurance schemes and their implication on financial cooperatives. Section 3 defines the data and the methodology used. Results are presented and interpreted in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Regulation, supervision and deposit insurance for financial cooperatives
Financial Cooperatives'-hereafter as FCs-are member-owned financial institutions such as cooperative banks, credit unions, credit cooperatives, as well as savings and credit cooperatives. Benefiting from strong social relations between small-group members, FCs with few members are similar to formalised rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) that are able to provide financial services to their members at low operational costs, by reducing information asymmetry problems associated with any financial intermediation. However, social relations and FCs' informational advantage weaken as the number of members grows, and establishing an efficient regulatory framework becomes necessary (Poyo 2000: 140) . There are strong incentives to put the FC sector under a prudential regulatory and supervisory framework regardless of their size. Jansson et al. (2004: 51) explained that large FCs should be regulated under prudential regulation and supervision in order to protect the deposits of large number of cooperative members. Furthermore, common bond is probably weak in large FCs making self-supervision more difficult, besides that large FCs may impose systematic risk to the whole sector. While acknowledging the challenges of applying prudential regulation and supervision on small FCs, Jansson et al. (2004: 51) does not undermine the importance of putting small FCs under the supervision of a qualified authority. In addition to the delegated/auxiliary approach-explained below-they recommend charging FCs a cost-covering supervision fees to ensure adequate supervision and to avoid cross-subsidising FCs by commercial banks.
FCs regulation should guide basic credit operations such as-among other thingsinternal credit policy, pricing, defining collaterals, contractual transparency, legal reserves, documentation, risk classification and risk weighting, non-performing loans, loan loss provisions and write-offs (Jansson et al. 2004: 27-48) . In addition, FCs regulation should maintain the autonomy of cooperatives and protect the sector from unsupportive government interference (Bamrungwon 1994: 55-56; Musumal 1994: 157-158; Münkner 2014; Khafagy 2017) , mitigate agency problems inherited in cooperatives governance structure (Taylor 1971; Westley and Shaffer 2000: 87; Branch and Baker 2000: 210-211; Cuevas and Fischer 2006) . Regulations should also support institutional integration between financial cooperatives and facilitate the creation of second-tier cooperatives or federations (Poyo 1995: 31; Guinnane 1997: 251-252; Desrochers and Fischer 2003; Cuevas and Fischer 2006: 16-17) , and set adequate capital requirements (Davis 1994; BCBS 2012 BCBS , 2015a .
The most desired approach for designing a cooperative law is participatory law-making process as suggested by (Münkner 1986: 123) in which cooperative representatives (e.g. second-tier cooperatives or federations) directly contribute, along with the legislator, in framing the cooperative legislation. Poprawa (2009: 2) argued that the evolution of FCs' regulatory and supervisory frameworks in most countries is highly associated with the development stage of the movement. In early stages, regulations focus on licensing and registration only. While in more advanced stages, policy makers introduce prudential measurements, financial and regulatory reporting standards, through the establishment of prudential standards and risk-based supervision framework that aims to assess capital adequacy and mitigate liquidity risks. Finally, in a well-developed financial cooperative system, the regulatory framework enforces a deposit guarantee system that creates confidence to depositors that their money is protected partly or fully. Cuevas and 5 Fischer (2006: 30) recognized three main legal frameworks that govern the FC sector in most countries. These are a specialized FC law, a general cooperative society's law, and a banking law. The latter framework is usually applied on all country's banking sector, including FCs, or only applied to large cooperatives while smaller ones are left to the cooperative society's law. Cuevas and Fischer (2006) Finally, deposit insurance schemes are widely recommended to protect depositors' assets and the total financial system from bank runs, however, the effectiveness of deposit insurance remains quite controversial. The general economic theory suggests that deposit insurance can improve the stability of banks by reducing the possibility of depositors' runs. However, such explicit safety net of insurance may reduce market discipline and creates amoral hazard by providing incentives for banks to invest in riskier assets, without being sufficiently monitored by the depositors, because any losses incurred will be shifted from the depositors to the insurance fund (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002: 1378) . Several empirical findings suggest that deposit insurance schemes tend to increase banks' instability, risk-taking behaviour, and reduce monitoring of large depositors on banks (Grossman 1992; Alston et al. 1994; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002; Ioannidou and Penas 2010) . While Hovakimian et al. (2003) found that introducing deposit insurance schemes might increase risk-taking behaviour for banks operating in countries with weak institutional structures such as low political and economic freedoms, high corruption and poor contract enforcement mechanisms. Contrary to that, Gropp and Vesala (2004) found that risk-taking behaviour of European banks had significantly decreased after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance. But unlike investor-owned financial institutions, there is no evidence in the literature of financial cooperatives supporting the argument that the adoption of deposit insurance schemes increases the likelihood of institutions to adopt risk-taking behaviour. That is because theoretically, the mutual ownership structure implies limited risk-taking behaviour. In investor-owned firm, shareholders are only residual claimants, thus they have incentives to adopt riskier behaviour as they can gain benefits from higher dividends or selling shares at market value. Shares in investorowned financial institutions are considered highly leveraged claims on the institution's residual profits, unlike mutual institutions where shareholders are also depositors, thus their shares are unleveraged (Karels and McClatchey 1999: 107-108) . Moreover, several approaches can make deposit insurance schemes for FCs more incentive compatible, and reduce agency costs and moral hazard. One approach is limited coverage that makes the insurance forces large depositors to closely monitor the performance of the institutions, and which will increase market discipline. Similar approach is coinsurance, in which depositors are not compensated for their total deposits, thus some of the depositors will be forced to monitor the institutions' risk strategy as they are exposed to losses (Beck 2004) . Another commonly preferred approach is risk-based deposit insurance, where insurance premiums are adjusted to reflect the risk of the institution's assets or capital adequacy performance (Hannafin and Mckillop 2007: 47) .
Data and method
Common measurements of financial sector development-as a whole-cover the size, depth, efficiency and stability of the sector (Beck et al. 1999 (IMF 2012: 181) . Tables 2 and 3 below provide an overview over variables used to measure FCs development, as well as the classification of regulatory, supervisory and deposit insurance variables, as well as the control.
Fixed and random effects ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators are used to measure the relationship between FCs' indicators and the type of regulation that governs them, the supervisory agency responsible to monitor their activities, and the existence of a deposit insurance scheme for the period from 1995 to 2014. Using panel data is convenient in this study to observe how changes in FCs' regulations, supervisory authority or the introduction of deposit insurance scheme affect the changes in size and depth of the sector in the economy. The basic structure for the OLS regression models here take the form of
The fixed-effect estimator performs OLS regression on Table 4 shows regression results that examine the relationship between indicators of FCs and the type of regulation governing their activities. In panel A, each of the three indicators (natural logarithm of penetration rate, deposits per GDP, and assets per GDP)
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are regressed against dummy variables representing the type of the relevant regulation.
The main explanatory variables are dummy variables representing specialised financial cooperative regulation; dual regulatory regime; banking regulation, non-bank financial institutions regulation (NBFI); and general cooperative society's regulation, in addition to a set of variables to control for GDP per capita, credit to private sector, financial freedom and property rights. In panel B, the changes in FCs' indicators are regressed against the first lag of the main explanatory variables, and the first lag of the FC indicator to control for the impact of the sector's size and outreach on its growth.
Finally, panel C reports the reversed regressions.
Columns (1), (6) and (11) who -though not focusing on financial cooperatives -found that profit-oriented microfinance institutions tends to limit their outreach to cover the costs of compliance with prudential regulations while maintaining the same profit rates. In contrast, not-forprofit microfinance institutions are more likely to reduce their profit rates to maintain the same outreach levels. Similarly, the findings of Akande et al. (2016) (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006: 33; Branch and Grace, 2008: 4; WOCCU, 2015: 10) . In addition, in many developing countries there were no tangible reforms introduced to cooperative society's regulations since they were originally adopted in the 1960s and 1970s', making them insufficient for FCs (Poyo, 2000: 142) . While Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) did not find a direct impact for financial regulations on the profitability or outreach of microfinance institutions, they suggested an indirect effect for regulations as they found that high leveraged institutions are able to reach more borrowers. Such argument is also relevant for FCs, as adequate financial regulation -contrary to general cooperative regulations -will enhance the cooperatives' ability to attract deposits or seek external funds and thus increase their services' outreach.
The results of columns (8) and (13) These results are not entirely unexpected, as Poyo (2000: 138) and Branch and Grace (2008: 3) have pointed out that FCs require prudential regulations that differ from traditional commercial banks regulations due to their governance structure, the geographic or sectoral concentration of their loan portfolios, and their focus on micro and small entrepreneurs. Adams (1999: 44) noted that bank-supervising authorities in many developing countries struggle to maintain effective monitoring over commercial banks in the first place, and it is not clear if they have the technical capacity to perform adequate supervision over FCs as well. In addition, banking authorities in developing countries may impose rules and practices that suit commercial banks but not necessarily adequate for FCs (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006: 32 No. of groups No. of countries FCs' indicators and a dummy variable constructed for the specialised supervision adopted in Kenya and South Africa (not included in the reported results).
Financial cooperatives supervisory authority
Columns (1), (6) and (11) may lack the required capacity to conduct sufficient prudential supervision over financial intermediary institutions, thus may hinder the development of FCs (Adams, 1999: 44; Poyo, 2000; Cuevas and Fischer, 2006: 32; BCBS, 2015a: 20) . In addition, column (13) in panel B shows a negative correlation between the change in FCs' assets per GDP and banking supervision, significant at the 10 percent level. Although the coefficients are not trivial and seem consistent with the results of table 4, that show negative correlation between FCs' indicators and banking regulation, however, I find it difficult to draw a solid conclusion from this result remotely from other results that does not show any correlation between banking supervision and FCs.
Moreover, the findings here do not provide insightful evidence to examine Cuevas and Fischer (2006: 31-32 ) argument in favour for dual supervision. Cuevas and Fischer explained how dual supervision puts the few big FCs who hold a significant number of members and assets under the well-developed supervision of banking authorities at lower cost, which can be adequate for a transition phase until establishing a unified supervisory framework to govern the whole sector. As noted before, effective monitoring and inspection over FCs is very challenging and expensive, as in many countries, there are hundreds or thousands of geographically remote and small FCs.
Again, I found no evidence that auxiliary supervision (indirect supervision) is associated with higher degree of development in the sector, and the results do not support or contradict the promising perception that auxiliary supervision can overcome these challenges associated with supervising FCs as suggested by Cuevas and Fischer (2006) , BCBS (2015a), and (2015b). No. of countries (10), (11) and (12), with a negative correlation between domestic credit to private sector and financial freedom with auxiliary supervision, statistically significant at 10 per cent. Whereas columns, (7), (8) and (9) Table 6 shows the correlations between financial cooperatives' indicators and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the financial cooperative sector is covered by a deposit insurance scheme, and the value 0 if not, using the same set of control variables.
Deposit insurance schemes for financial cooperatives
Columns (1), (2) and (3) That is why cooperatives are less likely to adopt risk-taking behaviour in the first place, even in the presence of deposit insurance systems, taking into account of course that the indicators tested here do not measure the risk-taking behaviour or the financial performance of financial cooperatives. These results however provide preliminary evidence that the introduction of deposit insurance may lead the financial cooperative sector to grow, because of increasing confidence in the sector, which helps in attracting new depositors (members), or encourage existing members to invest more in their cooperative. Karels and McClatchey (1999) found no evidence that credit unions' risktaking behaviour in the United States had increased after the adoption of deposit insurance scheme, during the period [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Their results showed that liquidity and asset quality improved, suggesting a decrease in risk-taking behaviour during the post deposit insurance period. However, Karels and McClatchey (1999: 132) suggested that not only the ownership structure that limits risk-taking behaviour is the reason for credit unions' stability, but also the strong regulatory environment adopted in the 1970s that had restricted credit unions' investment strategies. As regulations at that time imposed limitations on the maximum loan size that can be offered by credit unions, and the maximum maturity for secured and unsecured loans. Similarly, Hannafin and McKillop (2007) found no evidence of risk shifting behaviour in the performance of Irish credit unions after to the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme in 1989.
However, again a causal relation between deposit insurance and FCs' size and outreach is difficult to demonstrate here. Panel C shows that countries with deposit insurance schemes tend to have high penetration rate, deposit and assets per GDP in the previous year, and they have higher GDP per capita than their counterparts. These results are in line with the categorisation of financial cooperative evolutionary stages proposed by Ferguson and McKillop (2000) . According to Ferguson and McKillop, the global financial cooperative movement can be divided into mature, transitional and nascent industries, whereas the establishment of deposit insurance mechanism is one of the key attributes of mature financial cooperative sectors alongside with large asset base. As for the control variables, panels A in tables 4, 5 and 6 show statistically significant positive correlation between FCs' penetration rate, deposits per GDP, and assets per GDP on one hand and GDP per capita, domestic credit provided by banks, financial freedom on the other hand. Moreover, there is statistically significant negative correlation between the development of FCs and property rights index. These results are similar to the ones reported in Khafagy (2017) . The positive correlation between FCs development indicators and GDP per capita is also consistent with Périlleux et al. (2016) showing that the level of economic development matters for the development of Finally, panels A and B show a statistically negative correlation between property rights index and FCs' growth. Khafagy (2017: 490) argued that the negative correlation between FCs' indicators and protection of property rights is reasonable because strict property rights laws aim to protect those who already have 'formal' assets, and limit the economic activities of the informal sector, where FCs' members are usually involved.
Conclusion
This essay examines the relationship between the development of financial cooperatives and the type of regulation that governs the sector, the supervisory agency responsible to monitor their activities, and the existence of a deposit insurance scheme, using panel data collected for sixty-five developing countries. Although causality is difficult to Financial cooperatives are not only significant for financial inclusion and economic growth, but their unique organisational structure could enable them to stimulate inclusive economic development by redistributing economic resources and opportunities in their economies. Because of that, financial cooperatives regulations must be flexible and responsive to the distinctive function of cooperatives and the complexity of the overall financial sector, in order to guarantee the stability of the sector and protect the interests of the members. Thus, a specialised legal framework seems to be the most suitable approach to regulate and supervise the sector.
